Competitive Procurement with Ex Post Moral Hazard

Indranil Chakraborty, Fahad Khalil, J. Lawarree
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the rent of efficient firms, it exacerbates the problem due to moral hazard. If allocative efficiency is a requirement, limiting the number of participants may be optimal. Alternatively, the same incentives can be optimally provided using inefficient allocation rules.
具有事后道德风险的竞争性采购
与标准拍卖不同,我们表明竞争性采购可能在最佳情况下限制竞争,或者使用低效的分配规则,以正概率将项目授予效率较低的公司。在竞争过程结束后,采购项目往往涉及事后道德风险。采购机制必须将激励计划与拍卖结合起来,以防止企业以低报价赢得合同,然后削减工作量。虽然竞争有助于降低高效企业的租金,但由于道德风险,它加剧了问题。如果要求分配效率,那么限制参与者的数量可能是最优的。或者,同样的激励可以使用低效的分配规则来最佳地提供。
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