Brent N. Chun, P. Buonadonna, Alvin AuYoung, Chaki Ng, D. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman, A. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat
{"title":"Mirage: a microeconomic resource allocation system for sensornet testbeds","authors":"Brent N. Chun, P. Buonadonna, Alvin AuYoung, Chaki Ng, D. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman, A. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat","doi":"10.1109/EMNETS.2005.1469095","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we argue that a microeconomic resource allocation scheme, specifically the combinatorial auction, is well suited to testbed resource management. To demonstrate this, we present the Mirage resource allocation system. In Mirage, testbed resources are allocated using a repeated combinatorial auction within a closed virtual currency environment. Users compete for testbed resources by submitting bids which specify resource combinations of interest in space/time (e.g., \"any 32 MICA2 motes for 8 hours anytime in the next three days\") along with a maximum value amount the user is willing to pay. A combinatorial auction is then periodically run to determine the winning bids based on supply and demand while maximizing aggregate utility delivered to users. We have implemented a fully functional and secure prototype of Mirage and have been operating it in daily use for approximately four months on Intel Research Berkeley's 148-mote sensornet testbed.","PeriodicalId":371563,"journal":{"name":"The Second IEEE Workshop on Embedded Networked Sensors, 2005. EmNetS-II.","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"202","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Second IEEE Workshop on Embedded Networked Sensors, 2005. EmNetS-II.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EMNETS.2005.1469095","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 202
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that a microeconomic resource allocation scheme, specifically the combinatorial auction, is well suited to testbed resource management. To demonstrate this, we present the Mirage resource allocation system. In Mirage, testbed resources are allocated using a repeated combinatorial auction within a closed virtual currency environment. Users compete for testbed resources by submitting bids which specify resource combinations of interest in space/time (e.g., "any 32 MICA2 motes for 8 hours anytime in the next three days") along with a maximum value amount the user is willing to pay. A combinatorial auction is then periodically run to determine the winning bids based on supply and demand while maximizing aggregate utility delivered to users. We have implemented a fully functional and secure prototype of Mirage and have been operating it in daily use for approximately four months on Intel Research Berkeley's 148-mote sensornet testbed.