The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence and the Challenges for Development in African Economies

G. Uzonwanne
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper surveys the pros and cons of Central Bank Independence and how it could help set developing economies on the path of steady growth. The research develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of central bank independence in budding democracies. The recent trend in Macro- Economic management has resulted in separation of powers between monetary and fiscal authorities with the resultant effect that governments are supposedly held in check regarding their borrowing and spending potential. Can this check be standardized and replicated in emerging democracies where the true values of democracy is yet to be felt or can Central Banks indeed say no to political pressure?
中央银行独立的政治经济学与非洲经济发展的挑战
本文调查了央行独立的利弊,以及它如何帮助发展中经济体走上稳定增长的道路。该研究为分析新兴民主国家的中央银行独立性提供了一个理论框架。最近宏观经济管理的趋势导致了货币和财政当局之间的权力分离,其结果是政府的借贷和支出潜力被认为受到了制约。这种检查能否在尚未感受到民主真正价值的新兴民主国家标准化和复制,或者央行真的能对政治压力说不吗?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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