Overpriced Shares, Ill-Advised Acquisitions, and Goodwill Impairment

Feng Gu, B. Lev
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引用次数: 244

Abstract

ABSTRACT: We establish that the root cause of many goodwill write-offs is the buyers' overpriced shares at acquisition. Overpriced shares provide managers with strong incentives to exploit the overpricing by acquiring businesses, often paying more than the acquisition's synergies, setting the stage for subsequent goodwill write-offs. In particular, we document the following patterns: (1) Share overpricing is strongly and positively associated with the intensity of corporate acquisitions and the growth of accounting goodwill. (2) Share overpricing predicts goodwill write-offs and their magnitude. (3) Acquisitions by overpriced companies—a strategy often recommended by investment bankers and some academics—are often ill-advised (overpaid for and/or strategic misfit), exacerbating the post-acquisition negative returns of buyers beyond the reversal of the overpricing. Thus, managers' arguments notwithstanding, goodwill write-off is an important event highlighting a dysfunctional investment strategy. Data Avai...
定价过高的股票,不明智的收购和商誉减值
摘要:本文认为,许多企业商誉冲销的根本原因是收购时收购方的股票价格过高。定价过高的股票给经理人提供了强烈的动机,促使他们利用定价过高的机会收购企业,通常支付的价格高于收购的协同效应,为随后的商誉冲销埋下伏笔。特别是,我们记录了以下模式:(1)股票过高定价与公司收购的强度和会计商誉的增长密切相关。(2)股价高估预测了商誉冲销及其规模。(3)被定价过高的公司收购——这是投资银行家和一些学者经常推荐的策略——通常是不明智的(出价过高和/或战略不匹配),在定价过高的逆转之外,加剧了收购后买家的负回报。因此,尽管管理者们有这样的论点,但商誉冲销是一个重要事件,突显出一种功能失调的投资策略。数据Avai……
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