Employer Reputation at Work

S. Estreicher
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Employer reputational costs - that is, the loss in value of the firm's reputational assets if the firm reneges on its promises to workers, both express and implied, - has played an important role in the economic literature of employment contracts, but this factor has itself generated little sustained analysis. Reputation is often offered as a late-appearing deus ex machina explaining why opportunistic behavior by employers even in internal labor markets is likely to be relatively unimportant. This standard explanation for the enforceability of implicit labor contracts in internal labor markets is problematic for at least three reasons. It assumes a well-functioning market in information about past and projected firm behavior, for a loss in employer reputation can only occur if job applicants from the external labor market are able readily to distinguish between "opportunistic" behavior (where, say, a termination of employment reflects an employer's reneging on implied promises of deferred compensation or late-career immunity from close monitoring of performance) and legitimate behavior (where a discharge reflects an appropriate response to shirking on the job or unforeseen business conditions). Second, the reputational-loss account is a static one; it assumes that employers in the first period (when they make the implied promise of deferred compensation or late-career job security) are in the same product market position in the later period (when they are expected to perform these implied promises). If the employer in the later period has disappeared, operates in a different product market, or has a need for workers with a different skill mix than in the first period, it will become even more difficult for job applicants in the external labor market to evaluate whether the firm's past behavior is a good predictor of their probable job experience with that firm. Finally, the explanation also makes certain problematic assumptions about how workers process information. The deficiencies of the standard explanation require either a reconsideration of implied labor market theory, or if implied labor market arrangements remain economically desirable an identification and possible strengthening of institutions that might enhance the firm's reputational costs in breaking promises to workers.
雇主在工作中的声誉
雇主声誉成本——即,如果公司违背对工人的承诺(包括明示的和暗示的),公司声誉资产的价值损失——在雇佣合同的经济学文献中发挥了重要作用,但这一因素本身几乎没有产生持续的分析。声誉常常被当作一种姗姗来迟的解药,解释为什么雇主的机会主义行为,甚至在内部劳动力市场也可能相对不重要。这种对内部劳动力市场隐性劳动合同可执行性的标准解释存在问题,原因至少有三个。它假设有一个关于过去和未来企业行为信息的运作良好的市场,因为雇主声誉的损失只有在外部劳动力市场的求职者能够很容易地区分“机会主义”行为(比如,雇佣关系的终止反映了雇主违背了对延迟补偿或职业生涯后期免于密切监视的隐含承诺)和合法行为(解雇反映了对工作上的逃避或不可预见的业务状况的适当反应)。其次,声誉损失账户是静态的;它假设雇主在第一阶段(当他们做出延期补偿或职业生涯后期工作保障的隐含承诺时)在后期(当他们被期望履行这些隐含承诺时)处于相同的产品市场地位。如果后期的雇主消失了,经营不同的产品市场,或者需要与第一阶段不同技能组合的工人,那么对于外部劳动力市场的求职者来说,评估公司过去的行为是否能很好地预测他们在该公司的工作经历将变得更加困难。最后,该解释还对工人如何处理信息做出了某些有问题的假设。标准解释的缺陷需要重新考虑隐含的劳动力市场理论,或者如果隐含的劳动力市场安排在经济上仍然是可取的,那么就需要识别并可能加强制度,这些制度可能会增加企业在违背对工人的承诺时的声誉成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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