Negligence, Public Bodies, and Ruthlessness

Abstract

The Law Commission has concluded in a recent consultation paper (‘Administrative Redress’) that claimants are able to sue public bodies successfully in negligence in an unacceptably wide range of circumstances. For this reason, it has proposed the introduction of a new touchstone of liability: ‘serious fault’. The Law Commission regards the liability regime it proposes as superior to the existing law since it would reduce the number of occasions on which claimants deflect public bodies from their core concerns (delivering goods and services that serve the public interest). The Law Commission also finds support for its proposal in a ‘principle of modified corrective justice’. On the analysis offered in this essay, the requirement of ‘serious fault’ is better understood as strengthening a commitment to ruthlessness (in the sense specified by Thomas Nagel) that is present in the existing law. This essay also argues for a reform of negligence law (as it applies to public bodies) that is very different from that proposed by the Law Commission. This is the application of the proportionality principle at the third stage of the duty of care test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman. More generally, this essay criticises the Law Commission on the ground that it assumes that public bodies have sufficient information to perform a wide range of tasks effectively. This is often not the case. Moreover, negligence law in its existing form is a (non-market) discovery-procedure by means of which public bodies can, when defending novel claims, become better acquainted with the environment in which they operate.