Tax Driven One-Time Dividends and the Managerial Discretion Hypothesis - New Evidence from Germany

C. Kaserer, Stephanie Roos, E. Wenger
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

There is an ongoing debate in the literature whether the positive stock price effects to the announcement of a dividend increase or a share repurchase should be explained by the information-signalling hypothesis or the managerial discretion hypothesis of by both of them. We propose a new study where the relevance of the managerial discretion hypothesis in explaining stock market reactions to pay-out announcements could be directly tested. For that purpose we analyse the announcement effects of one-time dividend payments by listed German companies. These dividends were paid in order to realise a tax saving opportunity for the shareholders caused by a revision of the German tax code. As the firms did no have much discretion in timing the disbursement, the event by itself should not have any informational impact. It will be shown that over a period of %B1 3 months around the announcement date the abnormal stock price effect is 3.4 to 4.6 times as high as the mere tax saving effect induced by the one-time dividend payment. Moreover, according to the managerial discretion hypothesis we find the stock price effect to be significantly lower for those companies generating the tax saving without paying out cash to shareholders.
税收驱动的一次性股利与管理自由裁量权假说——来自德国的新证据
在文献中存在一个持续的争论,即股票价格对股利增加或股票回购的积极影响是否应该由信息信号假设或两者的管理自由裁量权假设来解释。我们提出了一项新的研究,其中管理自由裁量权假设在解释股票市场对支付公告的反应中的相关性可以直接测试。为此,我们分析了德国上市公司一次性派息的公告效应。支付这些股息是为了实现由德国税法修订引起的股东节税机会。由于公司在支付时间上没有太多的自由裁量权,事件本身不应该有任何信息影响。结果表明,在公告日期前后的%B1 3个月期间内,异常股价效应是一次性股息支付引起的单纯税收节省效应的3.4至4.6倍。此外,根据管理自由裁量权假设,我们发现那些产生税收节约而不向股东支付现金的公司的股价效应明显较低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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