PIE: Parser Identification in Embedded Systems

L. Cojocar, Jonas Zaddach, Roel Verdult, H. Bos, Aurélien Francillon, D. Balzarotti
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引用次数: 26

Abstract

Embedded systems are responsible for the security and safety of modern societies, controlling the correct operation of cars and airplanes, satellites and medical equipment, military units and all critical infrastructures. Being integrated in large and complex environments, embedded systems need to support several communication protocols to interact with other devices or with their users. Interestingly, embedded software often implements protocols that deviate from their original specifications. Some are extended with additional features, while others are completely undocumented. Furthermore, embedded parsers often consist of complex C code which is optimized to improve performance and reduce size. However, this code is rarely designed with security in mind, and often lacks proper input validation, making those devices vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. Furthermore, most embedded designs are closed source and third party security evaluations are only possible by looking at the binary firmware. In this paper we propose a methodology to identify parsers and complex processing logic present in binary code without access to their source code or documentation. Specifically we establish and evaluate a heuristic for detecting this type of code by means of static analysis. Afterwards we demonstrate the utility of this heuristic to identify firmware components treating input, perform reverse engineering to extract protocols, and discover and analyze bugs on four widely used devices: a GPS receiver, a power meter, a hard disk drive (HDD) and a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).
嵌入式系统中的解析器识别
嵌入式系统负责现代社会的安全与保障,控制汽车和飞机、卫星和医疗设备、军事单位和所有关键基础设施的正确运行。由于集成在大型复杂环境中,嵌入式系统需要支持多种通信协议才能与其他设备或其用户进行交互。有趣的是,嵌入式软件经常实现偏离其原始规范的协议。有些扩展了额外的功能,而另一些则完全没有文档记录。此外,嵌入式解析器通常由复杂的C代码组成,这些代码经过优化以提高性能并减小大小。然而,这些代码很少在设计时考虑到安全性,并且通常缺乏适当的输入验证,使得这些设备容易受到内存损坏攻击。此外,大多数嵌入式设计都是闭源的,第三方安全评估只能通过查看二进制固件来实现。在本文中,我们提出了一种方法来识别二进制代码中存在的解析器和复杂的处理逻辑,而无需访问其源代码或文档。具体来说,我们建立并评估了一种启发式方法,通过静态分析来检测这种类型的代码。之后,我们演示了这种启发式方法的实用性,以识别处理输入的固件组件,执行逆向工程以提取协议,并发现和分析四种广泛使用的设备上的错误:GPS接收器,功率计,硬盘驱动器(HDD)和可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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