Innovating Big Tech Firms and Competition Policy: Favoring Dynamic Over Static Competition

N. Petit, D. Teece
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引用次数: 33

Abstract

This paper gives a fresh account of competition in the digital economy. Economic analysis in the field of industrial organization remains largely focused on a sophisticated version of the Schumpeter–Arrow debate, which is unresolved and largely irrelevant. We posit the need to look at competition anew. Static models of monopoly firms and markets in equilibrium are often used to characterize Big Tech firms’ size and scope. We suggest that this characterization is inappropriate because the growth and diversification of many digital firms lead to a situation of broad-spectrum competition that cuts across markets. Current market positions do not reflect entrenched monopoly power but are vulnerable to competitive pressure of disequilibrating forces arising from the use of data-driven operating models, astute resource orchestration, and the exercise of dynamic capabilities. A few strategic errors by management in the handling of internal transitions and/or external challenges and they could be competitively impaired. The implications of a more dynamic understanding of the competition process in the tech sector are explored. We consider how big data and entrepreneurial management impacts firm performance. We also explore the nature of different types of rents (Schumpeterian, Ricardian, and monopoly rents) and suggest a modified long-term consumer welfare standard for competition policy. We formulate preliminary tests and predictors to assess dynamic competition. Our perspective advances a policy stance that favors innovation.
创新大型科技公司与竞争政策:动态竞争大于静态竞争
本文对数字经济中的竞争进行了全新的阐释。产业组织领域的经济分析仍然主要集中在熊彼特-阿罗辩论的复杂版本上,这一争论尚未解决,而且在很大程度上是无关紧要的。我们认为有必要重新审视竞争。垄断企业和均衡市场的静态模型经常被用来描述大型科技公司的规模和范围。我们认为这种描述是不合适的,因为许多数字公司的增长和多样化导致了跨市场的广谱竞争。目前的市场地位并没有反映出根深蒂固的垄断力量,但很容易受到不平衡力量的竞争压力的影响,这种压力来自于使用数据驱动的运营模式、精明的资源编排和动态能力的运用。管理层在处理内部转型和/或外部挑战时出现的一些战略错误,可能会损害其竞争力。本文探讨了对科技行业竞争过程的更动态理解的含义。我们考虑大数据和创业管理如何影响公司绩效。我们还探讨了不同类型租金的性质(熊彼特租金、李嘉图租金和垄断租金),并提出了一个修改后的竞争政策的长期消费者福利标准。我们制定初步测试和预测来评估动态竞争。我们的观点提出了有利于创新的政策立场。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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