Power flow cyber attacks and perturbation-based defense

K. Davis, Kate L. Morrow, R. Bobba, E. Heine
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引用次数: 70

Abstract

In this paper, we present two contributions to false data injection attacks and mitigation in electric power systems. First, we introduce a method of creating unobservable attacks on the AC power flow equations. The attack strategy details how an adversary can launch a stealthy attack to achieve a goal. Then, we introduce a proactive defense strategy that is capable of detecting attacks. The defense strategy introduces known perturbations by deliberately probing the system in a specific, structured manner. We show that the proposed approach, under certain conditions, is able to detect the presence of false data injection attacks, as well the attack locations and information about the manipulated data values.
潮流网络攻击和基于扰动的防御
在本文中,我们提出了电力系统中虚假数据注入攻击和缓解的两个贡献。首先,我们介绍了一种对交流功率流方程产生不可观察攻击的方法。攻击策略详细说明了对手如何发动隐形攻击以达到目标。然后,我们引入了一种能够检测攻击的主动防御策略。防御策略通过故意以一种特定的、结构化的方式探测系统来引入已知的扰动。我们表明,在一定条件下,所提出的方法能够检测到虚假数据注入攻击的存在,以及攻击位置和有关被操纵数据值的信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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