Personalized Pricing via Strategic Learning of Buyers’ Social Interactions

Qinqi Lin, Lingjie Duan, Jianwei Huang
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Abstract

As the sociological theory of homophily suggests, people tend to interact with those of similar preferences. This motivates product sellers to learn buyers’ product preferences from the buyers’ friends’ purchase records. Although such learning allows sellers to enable personalized pricing to improve profits, buyers are also increasingly aware of such practices and may alter their behaviors accordingly. This paper presents the first study regarding how buyers may strategically manipulate their social interaction signals considering their preference correlations, and how an informed seller can take buyers’ strategic social behaviors into consideration when designing the pricing schemes. Our analytical results show that only high-preference buyers tend to manipulate their social interactions to hurdle the seller’s personalized pricing. Surprisingly, these high-preference buyers’ payoff may become worse after their strategic manipulation. Furthermore, we show that the seller can greatly benefit from the learning practice, no matter whether the buyers are aware of such learning or not. In fact, buyers’ learning-aware strategic manipulation only slightly reduces the seller’s revenue. Considering the increasingly stricter policies on data access by authorities, it is thus advisable for sellers to make buyers aware of their access and learning based on social interaction data. This justifies well with current regulatory policies and industry practices regarding informed consent for data sharing.
基于买家社交互动策略学习的个性化定价
正如同质性的社会学理论所表明的那样,人们倾向于与那些有着相似偏好的人互动。这促使产品卖家从买家朋友的购买记录中了解买家的产品偏好。虽然这种学习使卖家能够通过个性化定价来提高利润,但买家也越来越意识到这种做法,并可能相应地改变自己的行为。本文首次研究了买家如何在考虑其偏好相关性的情况下策略性地操纵其社会互动信号,以及知情的卖家如何在设计定价方案时考虑买家的战略社会行为。我们的分析结果表明,只有高偏好的买家倾向于操纵他们的社交互动来阻碍卖家的个性化定价。令人惊讶的是,这些高偏好买家的收益可能会在他们的策略操纵后变得更差。此外,我们表明,无论买方是否意识到这种学习实践,卖方都可以从学习实践中受益匪浅。事实上,买方的学习意识策略操作只会轻微减少卖方的收入。考虑到当局对数据访问的政策越来越严格,卖家可以根据社交互动数据让买家了解自己的访问和学习情况。这与当前关于数据共享知情同意的监管政策和行业实践相吻合。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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