Strong secrecy for erasure wiretap channels

A. Suresh, A. Subramanian, A. Thangaraj, M. Bloch, S. McLaughlin
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引用次数: 52

Abstract

We show that duals of certain low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, when used in a standard coset coding scheme, provide strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC). This result hinges on a stopping set analysis of ensembles of LDPC codes with block length n and girth ⋛ for some ⋛. We show that if the minimum left degree of the ensemble is lmin, the expected probability of block error is O(1/n⌈l mink/2⌉ −k) when the erasure probability ∊ < ∊ef, where ∊ef depends on the degree distribution of the ensemble. As long as lmin and k > 2, the dual of this LDPC code provides strong secrecy over a BEWC of erasure probability greater than 1–∊ef.
擦除窃听通道的强保密性
我们证明了某些低密度奇偶校验(LDPC)码的对偶,当用于标准的协集编码方案时,在二进制擦除窃听信道(BEWC)上提供了强保密性。这一结果取决于对块长度为n、周长为的LDPC码集合的停止集分析。我们证明了当集合的最小左度为lmin时,当擦除概率为< < ef,其中ef依赖于集合的度分布时,块错误的期望概率为O(1/n≤≤l k/2 k)。只要lmin和k > 2,该LDPC码的对偶在擦除概率大于1 - ef的BEWC上提供了强保密性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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