Impression management at board meetings: accountability in public and in private

Helen R. Pernelet, N. Brennan
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Abstract

PurposeTo demonstrate transparency and accountability, the three boards in this study are required to meet in public in front of an audience, although the boards reserve confidential issues for discussion in private sessions. This study examines boardroom public accountability, contrasting it with accountability in board meetings held in private. The study adopts Erving Goffman's impression management theory to interpret divergences between boardroom behaviour in public and private, or “frontstage” and “backstage” in Goffman's terminology.Design/methodology/approachThe research observes and video-records three board meetings for each of the three boards (nine board meetings), in public and private. The research operationalises accountability in terms of director-manager question-and-answer interactions.FindingsIn the presence of an audience of local stakeholders, the boards employ impression management techniques to demonstrate accountability, by creating the impression that non-executive directors are performing challenge and managers are providing satisfactory answers. Thus, they “save the show” in Goffman terms. These techniques enable board members and managers to navigate the interface between demonstrating the required good governance and the competence of the organisations and their managers, while not revealing issues that could tarnish their image and concern the stakeholders. The boards need to demonstrate to the audience that “matters are what they appear to be”, even if they are not. The research identifies behaviour consistent with impression management to manage this complexity. The authors conclude that regulatory objectives have not met their transparency aspirations.Originality/valueFor the first time, the research studies the effect of transparency regulations (“sunshine” laws) on the behaviour of boards of directors meeting in public. The study contributes to the embryonic literature based on video-taped board meetings to access the “black box” of the boardroom, which permits a study of impression management at board meetings not previously possible. This study extends prior impression management theory by identifying eleven impression management techniques that non-executive directors and managers use and which are unique to a boardroom context.
董事会印象管理:公开和私下问责
为了展示透明度和问责制,本研究中的三个董事会被要求在公众面前举行公开会议,尽管董事会保留机密问题在私人会议上讨论。本研究考察了董事会的公共问责制,并将其与私下举行的董事会问责制进行了对比。本研究采用欧文·戈夫曼(Erving Goffman)的印象管理理论来解释董事会在公开场合和私下场合的行为差异,或者用戈夫曼的术语来说是“前台”和“后台”。设计/方法/方法该研究观察并录像了三个董事会(九次董事会会议)中的每个董事会的三次公开和私下会议。该研究从董事-经理问答互动的角度将问责制操作化。在当地利益相关者在场的情况下,董事会采用印象管理技术,通过创造一种印象,即非执行董事正在执行挑战,经理正在提供令人满意的答案,来展示问责制。因此,用戈夫曼的话来说,他们“拯救了这部剧”。这些技术使董事会成员和管理人员能够在展示所需的良好治理与组织及其管理人员的能力之间进行导航,同时不会暴露可能损害其形象并引起利益相关者关注的问题。董事会需要向听众证明,“重要的是表面上看起来的样子”,即使事实并非如此。该研究确定了与印象管理相一致的行为来管理这种复杂性。作者得出的结论是,监管目标没有达到他们对透明度的期望。原创性/价值本研究首次研究了透明度法规(“阳光”法)对董事会公开会议行为的影响。这项研究为基于董事会会议录像的初步文献做出了贡献,以进入董事会的“黑匣子”,这使得对董事会会议上的印象管理进行研究成为可能,这在以前是不可能的。本研究扩展了先前印象管理理论,确定了非执行董事和经理使用的11种印象管理技术,这些技术在董事会环境中是独一无二的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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