Institutional Trading during a Wave of Corporate Scandals: 'Perfect Payday'?

Gennaro Bernile, Johan Sulaeman, Qin Emma Wang
{"title":"Institutional Trading during a Wave of Corporate Scandals: 'Perfect Payday'?","authors":"Gennaro Bernile, Johan Sulaeman, Qin Emma Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2159779","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the role of institutional trading during the option backdating scandal of 2006–2007. Unlike their inability to anticipate other corporate events, institutional investors as a group display negative abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell volumes) in anticipation of firm-specific backdating exposures. Consistent with informed trading, the underlying trades earn positive abnormal short- and long-term profits. Moreover, the negative abnormal imbalances are larger in magnitude when backdating is likely a more severe issue. Local institutions, in particular, display negative trading imbalances earlier in event-time and earn consistently higher trading profits than non-local institutions. Although we find some evidence of over-reaction following the arrival of information about the backdating scandal, these patterns are short-lived and exclusively due to the activity of non-local institutions. Overall, institutional investors behave as informed investors, particularly in local stocks, during this prolonged period of heightened uncertainty about corporate reporting and governance practices.","PeriodicalId":202253,"journal":{"name":"University of Miami Herbert Business School Research Paper Series","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"30","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Miami Herbert Business School Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2159779","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 30

Abstract

This paper examines the role of institutional trading during the option backdating scandal of 2006–2007. Unlike their inability to anticipate other corporate events, institutional investors as a group display negative abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell volumes) in anticipation of firm-specific backdating exposures. Consistent with informed trading, the underlying trades earn positive abnormal short- and long-term profits. Moreover, the negative abnormal imbalances are larger in magnitude when backdating is likely a more severe issue. Local institutions, in particular, display negative trading imbalances earlier in event-time and earn consistently higher trading profits than non-local institutions. Although we find some evidence of over-reaction following the arrival of information about the backdating scandal, these patterns are short-lived and exclusively due to the activity of non-local institutions. Overall, institutional investors behave as informed investors, particularly in local stocks, during this prolonged period of heightened uncertainty about corporate reporting and governance practices.
企业丑闻浪潮中的机构交易:“完美发薪日”?
本文考察了2006-2007年期权回溯丑闻中机构交易的作用。与他们无法预测其他公司事件不同,机构投资者作为一个群体,在预期公司特定的回溯风险敞口时,表现出负的异常交易失衡(即买入减去卖出)。与知情交易一致,基础交易获得正的异常短期和长期利润。此外,当回溯可能是一个更严重的问题时,负异常失衡的规模更大。尤其是本地机构,在交易时段较早出现负的交易不平衡,并持续赚取比非本地机构更高的交易利润。虽然我们发现一些证据表明,在有关回溯丑闻的信息到来后,市场反应过度,但这些模式是短暂的,完全是由非本地机构的活动造成的。总体而言,在公司报告和治理实践的不确定性加剧的漫长时期,机构投资者表现得像知情的投资者,尤其是在本地股市。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信