Pricing Strategy of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Quality of Recycled Mobile Phone and Effort Cost

Xueqing Guo, Kai Liu
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Abstract

In the age of mobile Internet, as a kind of unique and necessary fast consumer electronic product with product volume, function attribute and value content, mobile phone’s recycle and reuse have become a widely concerned social problem. Considering the influence of the quality level and effort cost of recycled mobile phones on the recycling profit, this paper constructs a decision-making model of the dual-channel mobile phone closed-loop supply chain composed of the manufacturer, distributor and the third-party online recycling platform to solve the optimization problem of the dualchannel closed-loop supply chain. This paper gains the optimal retail price and the quality level of recycled mobile phones under decentralized and centralized decision-making by applying the game theory. The results show that the total profit and mobile phone quality level of closed-loop supply chain are higher than that of decentralized decision, too much efforts cost can lead to the loss of phone quality and profits, the quality of recycled mobile phone and effort cost is the key to the profit of supply chain.
考虑回收手机质量和努力成本的双渠道闭环供应链定价策略
在移动互联网时代,手机作为一种具有产品体积、功能属性和价值内容的独特的、必不可少的快速消费电子产品,其回收再利用问题已成为人们广泛关注的社会问题。考虑到回收手机的质量水平和努力成本对回收利润的影响,本文构建了由制造商、分销商和第三方在线回收平台组成的双渠道手机闭环供应链决策模型,解决了双渠道闭环供应链的优化问题。本文运用博弈论的方法,得到了分散决策和集中决策下回收手机的最优零售价格和质量水平。结果表明,闭环供应链的总利润和手机质量水平高于分散决策,过多的努力成本会导致手机质量和利润的损失,回收手机的质量和努力成本是供应链利润的关键。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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