ZEKRO: Zero-Knowledge Proof of Integrity Conformance

Heini Bergsson Debes, Thanassis Giannetsos
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

In the race toward next-generation systems of systems, the adoption of edge and cloud computing is escalating to deliver the underpinning end-to-end services. To safeguard the increasing attack landscape, remote attestation lets a verifier reason about the state of an untrusted remote prover. However, for most schemes, verifiability is only established under the omniscient and trusted verifier assumption, where a verifier knows the prover’s trusted states, and the prover must reveal evidence about its current state. This assumption severely challenges upscaling, inherently limits eligible verifiers, and naturally prohibits adoption in public-facing security-critical networks. To meet current zero trust paradigms, we propose a general ZEro-Knowledge pRoof of cOnformance (ZEKRO) scheme, which considers mutually distrusting participants and enables a prover to convince an untrusted verifier about its state’s correctness in zero-knowledge, i.e., without revealing anything about its state.
零知识完整性一致性证明
在迈向下一代系统的竞赛中,边缘和云计算的采用正在升级,以提供基础的端到端服务。为了保护日益增加的攻击形势,远程认证允许验证者了解不受信任的远程证明者的状态。然而,对于大多数方案,可验证性仅在无所不知且可信的验证者假设下建立,验证者知道证明者的可信状态,并且证明者必须披露有关其当前状态的证据。这种假设严重挑战了升级,固有地限制了合格的验证器,并且自然地禁止在面向公众的安全关键网络中采用。为了满足当前的零信任范例,我们提出了一种通用的零知识一致性证明(ZEKRO)方案,该方案考虑了相互不信任的参与者,并使证明者能够说服不受信任的验证者在零知识中其状态的正确性,即无需透露任何有关其状态的信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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