Rights’ Relation to the First and Second Person

Abstract

Chapter 4 develops a new account of what it is to be owed a duty. There are two parts to the analysis. The first part says that it is distinctive of a duty owed to a capable party (an adult, young person, corporation as opposed to, e.g. a baby or a rabbit) that that party is required to conceive the action the duty enjoins in first-personal terms as to be ‘done to me’. The second part says that it is distinctive of a duty owed to any party whatsoever (including ‘incapable’ parties such as babies or rabbits) that the duty-bearer is required to conceive the action the duty enjoins in second-personal terms as to be ‘done to an addressable party, a being conceivable as “you”’. These requirements need not be met for the duty to exist, for it to be fulfilled by its bearer, or for it to have a direction—but their obtaining as requirements is definitive of its being owed to someone. The chapter shows how this distinguishes demanding on one’s own behalf as owed a duty from demanding on behalf of another or in relation to an undirected duty.