First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes

J. Currie, W. Macleod
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引用次数: 276

Abstract

We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians.
首先不伤害?:侵权改革和生育结果
我们使用1989-2001年的美国出生记录来检验侵权改革的影响。我们做出了四个贡献:首先,我们建立了一个模型来分析具体侵权改革所产生的激励。其次,我们收集了有关侵权改革的新数据。第三,我们考察了一系列结果。最后,我们考虑到人口统计/风险群体的差异影响。我们发现,对“财大气大规则”的改革减少了分娩和剖腹产的并发症,而对非经济损害的上限则增加了这些并发症。我们的研究结果表明,侵权行为法产生的激励与医生面临的其他激励之间存在重要的相互作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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