When Do Investors Know? Security Class Action Lawsuits, Short Selling, and Pre-filing News Releases

Chris Stivers, Licheng Sun, Sounak Saha
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Abstract

Prior literature on security class-action lawsuits generally treats the lawsuit filing day as the day when the event become public, in terms of evaluating event-study returns and informed shorting activity. However, in the days prior to the lawsuit filing, our investigation reveals that there are public announcements of law-firm investigations into more than half of the sued firms. Over our 2009-2019 sample, accounting for these pre-filing investigation announcements weakens prior evidence that suggested short-selling investors tend to anticipate the lawsuit filing from private information or inference from related industry litigation. Strikingly, the average cumulative abnormal return over the 5-day pre-event filing window is about -6.5% for our full sample (similar to prior studies) but it is only about -2.2% when excluding the lawsuits with a recent pre-filing investigation announcement. Regarding responses to the public news releases, we find that: (1) the coincident abnormal short selling and negative abnormal returns are much larger for the higher quality lawsuits, and (2) the abnormal shorting coincident with the initial public news about the lawsuit is reliably negatively related to the post-news abnormal return. Thus, in addition to weakening an anticipatory shorting view, our evidence provides considerable support to conclusions in Engelberg, Reed, and Ringenberg (2012) - - that short sellers are skilled at analyzing publicly available information.
投资者什么时候知道?证券集体诉讼,卖空和预备案新闻发布
在评估事件研究收益和知情卖空行为方面,以往关于证券集体诉讼的文献一般将诉讼立案日视为事件公开之日。但是,调查结果显示,在起诉前几天,有一半以上的律师事务所公布了对被起诉事务所的调查。在我们2009-2019年的样本中,对这些立案前调查公告的考虑削弱了先前的证据,这些证据表明,卖空投资者倾向于从私人信息或相关行业诉讼的推断中预测提起诉讼。引人注目的是,在我们的整个样本中,5天的事件前备案窗口的平均累积异常回报约为-6.5%(与之前的研究相似),但在排除最近的备案前调查公告的诉讼时,它仅为-2.2%左右。对于公众新闻发布的反应,我们发现:(1)对于高质量的诉讼,同时发生的异常卖空和负异常收益要大得多;(2)与诉讼初始公开新闻同时发生的异常卖空与新闻发布后的异常收益呈可靠负相关。因此,除了削弱预期卖空观点外,我们的证据还为Engelberg、Reed和Ringenberg(2012)的结论提供了相当大的支持——卖空者善于分析公开可用的信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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