{"title":"The Costs of Financial Distress Across Industries","authors":"Arthur Korteweg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.945425","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I estimate the market's opinion of ex-ante costs of financial distress (CFD) from a structurally motivated model of the industry, using a panel dataset of monthly market values of debt and equity for 269 firms in 23 industries between 1994 and 2004. CFD are identified from market values and betas of a company's debt and equity. The market expects costs of financial distress of 5% of firm value for observed leverage ratios. In bankruptcy, distress costs can rise as high as 31%. Across industries, CFD are driven primarily by the potential for debt overhang problems and distressed asset fire-sales. There is considerable empirical support for the hypothesis that firms choose a leverage ratio based on the trade-off between tax benefits and CFD. The results do not confirm the under-leverage puzzle for firms with publicly traded debt.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"46","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.945425","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 46
Abstract
I estimate the market's opinion of ex-ante costs of financial distress (CFD) from a structurally motivated model of the industry, using a panel dataset of monthly market values of debt and equity for 269 firms in 23 industries between 1994 and 2004. CFD are identified from market values and betas of a company's debt and equity. The market expects costs of financial distress of 5% of firm value for observed leverage ratios. In bankruptcy, distress costs can rise as high as 31%. Across industries, CFD are driven primarily by the potential for debt overhang problems and distressed asset fire-sales. There is considerable empirical support for the hypothesis that firms choose a leverage ratio based on the trade-off between tax benefits and CFD. The results do not confirm the under-leverage puzzle for firms with publicly traded debt.