The 1974 Budget Act's Impact on U.S. Spending and Debt: A Synthetic Control Study

Massimiliano Ferraresi, G. Gucciardi, Leonzio Rizzo
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Abstract

The 1974 Budget Act marked a turning point in U.S. budgeting history. With the Act, Congress decisively asserted its fiscal power, becoming more independent from the President in developing the budget and appropriating funds. Lawmakers at the time believed that the status quo, wherein Congress approved the budget in a piecemeal fashion, improperly limited their authority. While rising deficits and debts put pressure on Washington to restrain them, the President’s most direct method for cutting spending – impoundment – caused the conflict between Congress and the President that boiled over and led to the Budget Act. In this paper, we set out to discover how this compromise, the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (or 1974 Budget Act), ultimately impacted spending and debt. More specifically we use a synthetic control model to test the alternative – what would have happened without the Act? In short, we find that after 1974, public debt-to-GDP and public expenditures-to-GDP both increased, but less than what they would have without it. Section 2 outlines the Institutional framework, Section 3 describes the empirical methodology, Section 4 discusses the data sample and the empirical strategy Section 5 describes the results, Section 6 discusses broad implications for modern reformers, and the Appendix shows the placebo tests which give robustness to synthetic control analysis.
1974年预算法对美国支出和债务的影响:一项综合控制研究
1974年的《预算法》是美国预算史上的一个转折点。通过该法案,国会果断地维护了自己的财政权力,在制定预算和拨款方面更加独立于总统。当时的议员们认为,国会以零敲碎打的方式批准预算的现状,不恰当地限制了他们的权力。虽然不断上升的赤字和债务给华盛顿施加了限制它们的压力,但总统削减开支的最直接方法——扣押——引起了国会和总统之间的冲突,最终导致了《预算法》的出台。在本文中,我们着手发现这种妥协,即1974年国会预算和蓄水控制法(或1974年预算法),最终如何影响支出和债务。更具体地说,我们使用一个综合控制模型来测试替代方案——如果没有该法案会发生什么?简而言之,我们发现,1974年之后,公共债务占gdp的比例和公共支出占gdp的比例都有所增加,但比没有这一比例时的水平要低。第2节概述了制度框架,第3节描述了实证方法,第4节讨论了数据样本和实证策略,第5节描述了结果,第6节讨论了对现代改革者的广泛影响,附录显示了安慰剂测试,该测试为综合控制分析提供了鲁棒性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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