Analysis on collusive game between owner of art work and investor

J. Ding, Xuefeng Zhang, Yi Wang
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Abstract

The fraud auction under collusion between owner of art work and investor in the art market may lead to advertisement effect, and affect the emotional estimation and non-rational decision of investor. Consequently, it would do harm to the better development of art market. This article analyzed the root and the realizable condition of collusion between owner and investor. The results showed that the benefits of owner and interior investor in fraud auction would become identical; Strengthening the control of marginal utility of one player may have an effect on the other's collusive activity, and leaded to decrease of fraud auction probability.
艺术品所有者与投资者的合谋博弈分析
艺术品市场中艺术品所有者与投资者串通的欺诈拍卖,可能产生广告效应,影响投资者的情感判断和非理性决策。因此,这将不利于艺术市场的更好发展。本文分析了业主与投资者合谋的根源及其实现条件。结果表明,在欺诈拍卖中,所有者和内部投资者的利益趋于一致;加强对参与人边际效用的控制可能会对参与人的共谋行为产生影响,从而导致欺诈拍卖概率的降低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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