Tongqing Qiu, Lusheng Ji, Dan Pei, Jia Wang, Jun Xu
{"title":"TowerDefense: Deployment strategies for battling against IP prefix hijacking","authors":"Tongqing Qiu, Lusheng Ji, Dan Pei, Jia Wang, Jun Xu","doi":"10.1109/ICNP.2010.5762762","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"IP prefix hijacking is one of the top security threats targeting today's Internet routing protocol. Several schemes have been proposed to either detect or mitigate prefix hijacking events. However, none of these approaches is adopted and deployed on a large-scale on the Internet for reasons such as scalability, economical practicality, or unrealistic assumptions about the collaborations among ISPs. Thus there are no actionable and deployable solutions for dealing with prefix hijacking. In this paper, we study key issues related to deploying and operating an IP prefix hijacking detection and mitigation system. Our contributions include (i) deployment strategies for hijacking detection and mitigation system (named as TowerDefense): a practical service model for prefix hijacking protection and effective algorithms for selecting agent locations for detecting and mitigating prefix hijacking attacks; and (ii) large scale experiments on PlanetLab and extensive analysis on the performance of TowerDefense.","PeriodicalId":344208,"journal":{"name":"The 18th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"12","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The 18th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2010.5762762","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Abstract
IP prefix hijacking is one of the top security threats targeting today's Internet routing protocol. Several schemes have been proposed to either detect or mitigate prefix hijacking events. However, none of these approaches is adopted and deployed on a large-scale on the Internet for reasons such as scalability, economical practicality, or unrealistic assumptions about the collaborations among ISPs. Thus there are no actionable and deployable solutions for dealing with prefix hijacking. In this paper, we study key issues related to deploying and operating an IP prefix hijacking detection and mitigation system. Our contributions include (i) deployment strategies for hijacking detection and mitigation system (named as TowerDefense): a practical service model for prefix hijacking protection and effective algorithms for selecting agent locations for detecting and mitigating prefix hijacking attacks; and (ii) large scale experiments on PlanetLab and extensive analysis on the performance of TowerDefense.