Cooperation Incentive System Balancing Virtual Credit in Mobile Ad hoc Networks

Yuri Ohata, Takashi Kamimoto, Ryoki Shinohara, H. Shigeno
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), non-cooperative nodes can refuse to forward packets to conserve their own resources despite MANETs depend on the nodes for delivering packets. To motivate nodes to forward packets, incentive systems using reputation and virtual credit have been proposed. However, we cannot use the systems for a long time, because they cannot regulate the virtual credit in the network. In this paper, we propose Cooperation Incentive System Balancing Virtual Credit (CIBC). CIBC decides the costs nodes pay to request their packets to be forwarded based on node reputations and the total amount of virtual credit in the network. Here, we introduce a method to calculate new node reputations which considers the number of times that nodes drop packets in order to motivate nodes to always forward packets. Moreover, source nodes preferentially request other nodes that do not have much credit to forward packets so that they can earn credit and prevent some nodes from getting too much credit. In this way, CIBC can regulate the amount of virtual credit in the network and prevent some nodes from getting excessive amounts of virtual credit so that more nodes are motivated to be cooperative. We evaluate CIBC by simulation, and the results show that CIBC can maintain the motivation of nodes to be cooperative while also regulating the amount of virtual credit in the network and suppressing differences in amounts of virtual credit between nodes to be within a reasonable range.
移动自组网中平衡虚拟信用的合作激励系统
在移动自组织网络(manet)中,尽管移动自组织网络依赖于非合作节点发送数据包,但非合作节点可以拒绝转发数据包以保护自己的资源。为了激励节点转发数据包,提出了基于信誉和虚拟信用的激励机制。然而,由于该系统不能对网络中的虚拟信用进行规范,我们不能长期使用。本文提出了平衡虚拟信用(CIBC)的合作激励机制。CIBC根据节点声誉和网络中的虚拟信用总额来决定节点请求转发数据包的成本。在这里,我们引入了一种计算新节点声誉的方法,该方法考虑节点丢弃数据包的次数,以激励节点始终转发数据包。并且,源节点会优先请求其他没有太多信用的节点转发数据包,从而获得信用,防止某些节点获得过多的信用。这样,CIBC可以调节网络中的虚拟信用额度,防止一些节点获得过多的虚拟信用,从而激励更多的节点进行合作。通过仿真对CIBC进行了评价,结果表明CIBC既能保持节点的合作动机,又能调控网络中的虚拟信用额度,将节点间的虚拟信用额度差异抑制在合理范围内。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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