{"title":"Start-Up Banks’ Default and the Role of Capital","authors":"Massimo Libertucci, Francesco Piersante","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2206389","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Regulation requires banks to hold a minimum capital endowment upon their establishment. But what role does initial capital play in a banki?½s lifecycle? This paper addresses the issue for start-up banks. We use both survival-time and binary choice models for a sample of newly-established Italian banks in the period 1994-2006, controlling for a broad set of possible drivers of default, such as market, managerial and financial variables. Our results suggest that initial capital does play a leading role in explaining both the timing and the likelihood of a failure. Other important drivers are organisation and a balanced growth path, while market and management variables appear to play a minor role. We then turn to a quasi-experimental design: exploiting a regulatory shift in 1999 we run a counterfactual analysis of the impact of a regulatory tightening of initial capital, which affected only a subsample of banks. The set of results suggests that the effect on banksi?½ survival may be significant.","PeriodicalId":389704,"journal":{"name":"Bank of Italy Research Paper Series","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"25","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Bank of Italy Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2206389","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Abstract
Regulation requires banks to hold a minimum capital endowment upon their establishment. But what role does initial capital play in a banki?½s lifecycle? This paper addresses the issue for start-up banks. We use both survival-time and binary choice models for a sample of newly-established Italian banks in the period 1994-2006, controlling for a broad set of possible drivers of default, such as market, managerial and financial variables. Our results suggest that initial capital does play a leading role in explaining both the timing and the likelihood of a failure. Other important drivers are organisation and a balanced growth path, while market and management variables appear to play a minor role. We then turn to a quasi-experimental design: exploiting a regulatory shift in 1999 we run a counterfactual analysis of the impact of a regulatory tightening of initial capital, which affected only a subsample of banks. The set of results suggests that the effect on banksi?½ survival may be significant.