Embodiment and Phenomenal Consciousness

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Abstract

Can the imaginary brains described in Chapter 1 have only representations of perceived patterns, objects, and events? Can hierarchical structures of neurons also represent feelings, beliefs, emotions, and other higher mental states? Creating feelings requires giving emotional perceptions, memories, plans, beliefs, and intentions. How can this be achieved? How are perceived objects and events using their significance for the fate of the conscious system? Do they meet the various needs of the system? In this chapter we show that to achieve this goal, to feel qualia and to create phenomenal awareness, it is necessary to embody the mind. Mental states, such as thoughts and desires, contain intentional content that can be described by referring to something that we expect or believe. Another category are sensory feelings that do not contain intentional content but instead have different qualitative properties like perceptions, impressions, and sensations. The authors indicate four main domains of cooperation between the body and the brain, so that the mind generated in the system has phenomenal consciousness. These domains are 1) The homeostatic system. The body or housing may contain sensors informing the brain about the internal conditions of the body. The signals from these sensors can complement the information coming from the external senses. 2) The motor system. The housing and body, together with the motor system, allow an individual to manipulate objects in the environment and its own body in the environment. The effects of these manipulations can broaden the experience and allow for their evaluation. 3) Participatory analysis. The body or housing can be used to predict, analyze, and plan activities by making calculations through a physical process. 4) The global states of the organism. Internal power supply parameters, information-processing speed, dynamics of operation, and sensitivity thresholds for internal and external sensors can affect performance, the results of evaluation of sensations, and the shape of neural representations. This assumption makes it possible to explain how the imaginary mind can feel subjective impressions, the qualia that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness. The bodily reactions to the sensory stimuli reaching the brain can give value to individual feelings, and emotions. Feeling hardness or smoothness, assessing the attractiveness of smells, judging the importance of sounds, and evaluating the favor of the environment based on images all go beyond the direct response of the senses. The entire brain is involved in the creation of a conscious mind, along with sensory processing, control of movements, memories, predictions, and all other brain structures. This is an emergent phenomenon that is not reflected in any part of the brain's apparatus. In this chapter, the authors explain to what extent we can be aware of our feelings, how far we can understand the world around us and our place in it, how we can consciously direct our thoughts, and how we can focus attention on something.
化身与现象意识
在第一章中描述的想象的大脑能否只有感知模式、物体和事件的表征?神经元的层次结构是否也能代表感觉、信念、情绪和其他更高级的精神状态?创造感觉需要给予情感感知、记忆、计划、信念和意图。如何才能做到这一点?被感知的物体和事件是如何利用它们的意义来决定意识系统的命运的?它们是否满足系统的各种需求?在这一章中,我们要说明,要达到这个目标,要感受质感,要创造非凡的觉知,就必须体现心。心理状态,如思想和欲望,包含有意的内容,可以通过引用我们期望或相信的东西来描述。另一类是感官感受,它们不包含有意的内容,而是具有不同的定性属性,如感知、印象和感觉。作者指出了身体和大脑之间合作的四个主要领域,因此在系统中产生的思想具有现象意识。这些领域是1)稳态系统。身体或外壳可能包含传感器,向大脑通报身体的内部情况。来自这些传感器的信号可以补充来自外部感官的信息。2)电机系统。外壳和身体,连同运动系统,允许个人在环境中操纵物体和自己的身体在环境中。这些操作的效果可以拓宽经验,并允许对其进行评价。3)参与性分析。身体或房屋可以通过物理过程进行计算来预测、分析和计划活动。有机体的整体状态。内部电源参数、信息处理速度、操作动态和内部和外部传感器的灵敏度阈值会影响性能、感觉评估结果和神经表征的形状。这一假设使我们有可能解释想象的心灵是如何感受到主观印象的,而这种感觉是现象意识的基础。身体对到达大脑的感官刺激的反应可以赋予个人感觉和情绪价值。感觉坚硬或光滑,评估气味的吸引力,判断声音的重要性,根据图像评估环境的有利程度,这些都超出了感官的直接反应。整个大脑都参与了意识的创造,以及感觉处理、运动控制、记忆、预测和所有其他大脑结构。这是一种不反映在大脑任何部分的突发现象。在这一章中,作者解释了我们能在多大程度上意识到自己的感受,我们能在多大程度上理解我们周围的世界和我们在其中的位置,我们如何有意识地引导我们的思想,以及我们如何将注意力集中在某事上。
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