SecDec: Secure Decode Stage thanks to masking of instructions with the generated signals

Gaëtan Leplus, O. Savry, L. Bossuet
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Abstract

Physical attacks are becoming a major security issue in IOT applications. One of the main vectors of attacks on processors is the corruption of the execution flow. Fault injections allow the modification of instructions, in particular jumps and branches. The proposed approach involves making a RISC-V processor's instruction path more resistant by introducing dependencies between succeeding instructions. The signals extracted from the instruction decoding stage is used to unmask the following instruction. Whereas all instructions have been previously masked during compilation with the expected mask. We show that this solution has a very low hardware overhead of 3.25% and power consumption of 4.33%. But also overhead software of 1.61% in code size and 1.12% in execution time. An instruction corruption or a jump will be detected on average in fewer than 2 cycles after the fault while making disassembling from side-channel leakages becomes more difficult.
SecDec:安全解码阶段,用生成的信号屏蔽指令
物理攻击正在成为物联网应用中的一个主要安全问题。处理器攻击的主要载体之一是执行流的损坏。错误注入允许修改指令,特别是跳转和分支。该方法通过引入后续指令之间的依赖关系,使RISC-V处理器的指令路径更具抗性。从指令解码阶段提取的信号用于揭开下面指令的掩码。而在编译期间,所有指令都已使用预期的掩码进行了掩码。我们表明,该解决方案的硬件开销非常低,为3.25%,功耗为4.33%。但也会增加1.61%的代码大小和1.12%的执行时间。在故障发生后,平均在不到2个周期内检测到指令损坏或跳转,而从侧信道泄漏中拆卸变得更加困难。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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