The Equilibrium Assignment of Narcissistic CEOs to Firms

Corporate Governance & Sociology or Psychology eJournal Pub Date : 2015-02-18 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2566708

Eric de Bodt, Helen Bollaert, P. Grandin, Richard Roll

引用次数: 4

Abstract

Firms may rationally select CEOs whose level of narcissism is compatible with their circumstances. We model the firm-CEO matching process in which narcissistic CEOs are matched to firms characterized by their shareholders’ risk aversion. This leads us to predict that (i) contemporaneous (future) CEO narcissism is increasing (decreasing) in the compensation package; (ii) CEO narcissism is decreasing in shareholder risk aversion and (iii) CEO narcissism is increasing in CEO narcissism mean reversion. We test our predictions on a 10-year sample of S&P 500 CEOs, using a time-varying measure of CEO narcissism. Our empirical results provide preliminary support for all our predictions.

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自恋型ceo对企业的均衡分配

企业可能会理性地选择那些自恋程度与其所处环境相适应的ceo。我们建立了自恋型ceo与股东风险厌恶型企业匹配的模型。这导致我们预测:(1)同时期(未来)CEO的自恋在薪酬方案中增加(减少);(2) CEO自恋在股东风险规避上呈下降趋势;(3)CEO自恋均值回归上呈上升趋势。我们以10年的标准普尔500指数(S&P 500)公司CEO为样本，使用一种随时间变化的CEO自恋程度衡量标准，来检验我们的预测。我们的实证结果为我们所有的预测提供了初步的支持。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Corporate Governance & Sociology or Psychology eJournal

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