Research on Incentive Mechanism of Teamwork Based on Unfairness Aversion Preference Model

F. Pang
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Abstract

From the perspective of the principal-agency relationship, this article assumes that team members have unfairness aversion preferences on the basis of rational actions. By constructing the behavior pattern of members in teamwork, the analysis shows that team members’ own output effort level and team members’ cooperative effort have relationship with team profit sharing coefficient, team members’ ability level and the spillover coefficient, while there is no obvious relationship between the cooperation conflict coefficient and the participants’ two types of efforts. In addition, the model explores the incentive effect of participants’ degree of aversion towards unfairness on both output efforts and cooperative efforts.
基于不公平厌恶偏好模型的团队合作激励机制研究
本文从委托代理关系的角度出发,假设团队成员在理性行为的基础上存在不公平厌恶偏好。通过构建团队成员的行为模式,分析发现团队成员自身的产出努力水平和团队成员的合作努力水平与团队的利益分享系数、团队成员的能力水平和溢出系数有关系,而合作冲突系数与参与者的两种努力之间没有明显的关系。此外,该模型还探讨了参与者对不公平的厌恶程度对产出努力和合作努力的激励效应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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