{"title":"Research on Incentive Mechanism of Teamwork Based on Unfairness Aversion Preference Model","authors":"F. Pang","doi":"10.1109/ICEMME51517.2020.00193","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"From the perspective of the principal-agency relationship, this article assumes that team members have unfairness aversion preferences on the basis of rational actions. By constructing the behavior pattern of members in teamwork, the analysis shows that team members’ own output effort level and team members’ cooperative effort have relationship with team profit sharing coefficient, team members’ ability level and the spillover coefficient, while there is no obvious relationship between the cooperation conflict coefficient and the participants’ two types of efforts. In addition, the model explores the incentive effect of participants’ degree of aversion towards unfairness on both output efforts and cooperative efforts.","PeriodicalId":447872,"journal":{"name":"2020 2nd International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME)","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 2nd International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICEMME51517.2020.00193","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
From the perspective of the principal-agency relationship, this article assumes that team members have unfairness aversion preferences on the basis of rational actions. By constructing the behavior pattern of members in teamwork, the analysis shows that team members’ own output effort level and team members’ cooperative effort have relationship with team profit sharing coefficient, team members’ ability level and the spillover coefficient, while there is no obvious relationship between the cooperation conflict coefficient and the participants’ two types of efforts. In addition, the model explores the incentive effect of participants’ degree of aversion towards unfairness on both output efforts and cooperative efforts.