{"title":"“Other” in the Third Hypothesis of “Parmenides\" (Prm. 158d3–6)","authors":"I. Protopopova","doi":"10.25205/1995-4328-2022-16-2-783-790","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of the paper is to comment on Prm. 158d3-6. Consideration of this passage is preceded by a brief overview of various approaches to “Parmenides”. The most important difference in the approaches is determined by the attitude of the researchers to the “subject” of the eight hypotheses. F. Cornford believes that “one” and “is” in Plato’s text are not unambiguous, therefore the “subjects” of hypotheses are different, and, consequently, the conclusions from these hypotheses, although different, are not contradictory. Cornford’s approach is productively developed by K. Sayre and R. Turnbull. The author’s interpretation of the “Parmenides” is based on the same premise of the ambiguity of “one” and “is”. Other researchers (R. Allen, S. Rickless, M. Tabak) disagree with this, insisting that the “subject” in all hypotheses is the same, so the conclusions of different hypotheses are contradictory, and the conclusion from the most extensive, the second hypothesis, is obviously absurd (Allen). Tabak’s point of view is particularly abrupt, assuming that Plato’s goal in the second part is a parody of the views of the Eleatics and Sophists, often presented with deliberately incorrect and absurd conclusions. Tabak believes that only the third hypothesis applies to the views of Plato himself. It is with that one that the second part of the paper is dealing, analyzig the sense of “other” in Prm. 158d3–6. The author consider what is the meaning of “nature other than eidos” in the context of the ideas of the “receptacle” and χώρa in the “Timaeus” (50d, 51a7–b1), and what is the “idea of the immensity” in the context of the reasoning about the one, many and immensity in the “Philebus” (16de). Another comment concerns the meaning of ἕτερόν τι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς γίγνεσθαι and compares several translations of this passage (Cornford, A. Hermann, S. Scolnicov, Sayre, Tabak). In conclusion, the author offers her own interpretation of “other” in connection with the seventh hypothesis of the “Parmenides”.","PeriodicalId":228501,"journal":{"name":"ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2022-16-2-783-790","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The main purpose of the paper is to comment on Prm. 158d3-6. Consideration of this passage is preceded by a brief overview of various approaches to “Parmenides”. The most important difference in the approaches is determined by the attitude of the researchers to the “subject” of the eight hypotheses. F. Cornford believes that “one” and “is” in Plato’s text are not unambiguous, therefore the “subjects” of hypotheses are different, and, consequently, the conclusions from these hypotheses, although different, are not contradictory. Cornford’s approach is productively developed by K. Sayre and R. Turnbull. The author’s interpretation of the “Parmenides” is based on the same premise of the ambiguity of “one” and “is”. Other researchers (R. Allen, S. Rickless, M. Tabak) disagree with this, insisting that the “subject” in all hypotheses is the same, so the conclusions of different hypotheses are contradictory, and the conclusion from the most extensive, the second hypothesis, is obviously absurd (Allen). Tabak’s point of view is particularly abrupt, assuming that Plato’s goal in the second part is a parody of the views of the Eleatics and Sophists, often presented with deliberately incorrect and absurd conclusions. Tabak believes that only the third hypothesis applies to the views of Plato himself. It is with that one that the second part of the paper is dealing, analyzig the sense of “other” in Prm. 158d3–6. The author consider what is the meaning of “nature other than eidos” in the context of the ideas of the “receptacle” and χώρa in the “Timaeus” (50d, 51a7–b1), and what is the “idea of the immensity” in the context of the reasoning about the one, many and immensity in the “Philebus” (16de). Another comment concerns the meaning of ἕτερόν τι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς γίγνεσθαι and compares several translations of this passage (Cornford, A. Hermann, S. Scolnicov, Sayre, Tabak). In conclusion, the author offers her own interpretation of “other” in connection with the seventh hypothesis of the “Parmenides”.
本文的主要目的是对Prm. 158d3-6进行评论。在考虑这篇文章之前,我们先简要概述了研究“巴门尼德”的各种方法。方法中最重要的区别是由研究人员对八种假设的“主体”的态度决定的。F. Cornford认为柏拉图文本中的“一”和“是”并不是明确的,因此假设的“主体”是不同的,因此,从这些假设中得出的结论虽然不同,但并不矛盾。康福德的方法是由K.塞尔和R.特恩布尔卓有成效地发展起来的。作者对《巴门尼德》的解读也是基于“一”与“是”的歧义性这一前提。其他研究者(R. Allen, S. Rickless, M. Tabak)不同意这一点,他们坚持认为所有假设中的“主体”都是相同的,因此不同假设的结论是相互矛盾的,而从最广泛的第二个假设得出的结论显然是荒谬的(Allen)。塔巴克的观点特别突兀,他假设柏拉图在第二部分的目的是模仿埃利亚派和诡辩派的观点,经常故意提出不正确和荒谬的结论。塔巴克认为,只有第三个假设适用于柏拉图本人的观点。这篇论文的第二部分分析了诗篇158 - 6中“他者”的含义。作者在《蒂迈奥》(50d, 51a7-b1)中的“容器”和χώρa概念的背景下思考了“自然而非eidos”的含义,在《菲勒伯斯》(16de)中关于一、多和无限的推理的背景下思考了什么是“无限的概念”。另一项评论是关于ν τερόν τι ν ν α ο ο ς γ rein - γνεσθαι的含义,并比较了这一段的几种翻译(Cornford, A. Hermann, S. Scolnicov, Sayre, Tabak)。最后,作者结合“巴门尼德”的第七个假设,提出了自己对“他者”的解释。