Who Tracks the Trackers?: Circumventing Apple's Anti-Tracking Alerts in the Find My Network

Travis Mayberry, Ellis Fenske, Dane Brown, Jeremy Martin, Christine Fossaceca, Erik C. Rye, Sam Teplov, Lucas Foppe
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引用次数: 15

Abstract

Apple's Find My protocol allows lost devices, such as AirTags, to relay their location to their owners via a network of over a billion active Apple devices. This convenient feature for device owners may also be a tool for malicious actors to cheaply and effectively track unknowing targets. Apple has introduced a featured known as "item safety alerts'' to prevent AirTags from being used this way. We demonstrate that it is possible to create a custom device, with similar features to an AirTag in terms of cost, size, and battery life, which can participate in and be tracked by Apple's Find My network while not triggering any item safety alerts. This implies that Apple's protection mechanism is insufficient. We suggest natural mitigations for two of our malicious tracker techniques but note that the third would require substantially altering the Find My protocol to defend against.
谁在追踪追踪者?:在“查找我的网络”中绕过苹果的反跟踪警报
苹果的“找我”协议允许丢失的设备,比如AirTags,通过一个由超过10亿个活跃的苹果设备组成的网络,将它们的位置传递给它们的主人。对于设备所有者来说,这个方便的功能也可能成为恶意行为者廉价而有效地跟踪未知目标的工具。苹果公司推出了一项名为“物品安全警报”的功能,以防止AirTags被以这种方式使用。我们证明,有可能创建一个定制设备,在成本、尺寸和电池寿命方面与AirTag具有相似的功能,它可以参与苹果的“查找我”网络,并被其跟踪,同时不会触发任何物品安全警报。这意味着苹果的保护机制是不够的。我们建议对我们的两种恶意跟踪技术进行自然缓解,但请注意,第三种技术将需要大幅修改查找我的协议来防御。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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