{"title":"Anti-corruptions and IPO Decision: Evidence from the Chinese Provincial Panel Data","authors":"Bingwei Chen, Guanglei Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3632826","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Relationship between IPOs and Local political turnover has been disputed and studied (Piotroski and Zhang (2014)). In this paper, we further focus on the anti-corruption and IPOs, since 2012 Chairman Xi announced and conducted a series of action of \"hit the tiger\" in order to reduce the anti-corruption and pure discipline in CPC. By examining and testing provincial panel data, we found the demotion of provincial officials can affect IPO decisions of Chinese companies that are eligible to list, those who take advantage of the window where companies lose political connections can lead to certain resource allocation inefficiencies. Additionally, firms performance and ownership could also be influenced by such demotion and anti-corruption.","PeriodicalId":448175,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Comparative Capitalism eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative Political Economy: Comparative Capitalism eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3632826","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Relationship between IPOs and Local political turnover has been disputed and studied (Piotroski and Zhang (2014)). In this paper, we further focus on the anti-corruption and IPOs, since 2012 Chairman Xi announced and conducted a series of action of "hit the tiger" in order to reduce the anti-corruption and pure discipline in CPC. By examining and testing provincial panel data, we found the demotion of provincial officials can affect IPO decisions of Chinese companies that are eligible to list, those who take advantage of the window where companies lose political connections can lead to certain resource allocation inefficiencies. Additionally, firms performance and ownership could also be influenced by such demotion and anti-corruption.
ipo与地方政治更替之间的关系一直存在争议和研究(Piotroski and Zhang(2014))。通过对省级面板数据的检验和检验,我们发现省级官员的降职会影响符合上市条件的中国企业的IPO决策,那些利用企业失去政治关系的窗口会导致一定的资源配置效率低下。此外,企业绩效和所有权也可能受到这种降职和反腐败的影响。