ChargePrint: A Framework for Internet-Scale Discovery and Security Analysis of EV Charging Management Systems

Tony Nasr, Sadegh Torabi, E. Bou-Harb, Claude Fachkha, C. Assi
{"title":"ChargePrint: A Framework for Internet-Scale Discovery and Security Analysis of EV Charging Management Systems","authors":"Tony Nasr, Sadegh Torabi, E. Bou-Harb, Claude Fachkha, C. Assi","doi":"10.14722/ndss.2023.23084","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"—Electric Vehicle Charging Management Systems (EVCMS) are a collection of specialized software that allow users to remotely operate Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS). With the increasing number of deployed EVCS to support the growing global EV fleet, the number of EVCMS are consequently growing, which introduces a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-stage framework, ChargePrint, to discover Internet-connected EVCMS and investigate their security posture. ChargePrint leverages identifiers extracted from a small seed of EVCMS to extend the capabilities of device search engines through iterative fingerprinting and a combination of classification and clustering approaches. Using initial seeds from 1,800 discovered hosts that deployed 9 distinct EVCMS, we identified 27,439 online EVCS instrumented by 44 unique EVCMS. Consequently, our in-depth security analysis highlights the insecurity of the deployed EVCMS by uncovering 120 0-day vulnerabilities, which shed light on the feasibility of cyber attacks against the EVCS, its users, and the connected power grid. Finally, while we recommend countermeasures to mitigate future threats, we contribute to the security of the EVCS ecosystem by conducting a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) effort with system developers/vendors who acknowledged and assigned the discovered vulnerabilities more than 20 CVE-IDs.","PeriodicalId":199733,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.23084","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

—Electric Vehicle Charging Management Systems (EVCMS) are a collection of specialized software that allow users to remotely operate Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (EVCS). With the increasing number of deployed EVCS to support the growing global EV fleet, the number of EVCMS are consequently growing, which introduces a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-stage framework, ChargePrint, to discover Internet-connected EVCMS and investigate their security posture. ChargePrint leverages identifiers extracted from a small seed of EVCMS to extend the capabilities of device search engines through iterative fingerprinting and a combination of classification and clustering approaches. Using initial seeds from 1,800 discovered hosts that deployed 9 distinct EVCMS, we identified 27,439 online EVCS instrumented by 44 unique EVCMS. Consequently, our in-depth security analysis highlights the insecurity of the deployed EVCMS by uncovering 120 0-day vulnerabilities, which shed light on the feasibility of cyber attacks against the EVCS, its users, and the connected power grid. Finally, while we recommend countermeasures to mitigate future threats, we contribute to the security of the EVCS ecosystem by conducting a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) effort with system developers/vendors who acknowledged and assigned the discovered vulnerabilities more than 20 CVE-IDs.
ChargePrint:一种互联网规模的电动汽车充电管理系统发现与安全分析框架
电动汽车充电管理系统(EVCMS)是一组专门的软件,允许用户远程操作电动汽车充电站(EVCS)。随着部署EVCS的数量不断增加,以支持不断增长的全球电动汽车车队,EVCMS的数量也随之增加,这引入了新的攻击面。在本文中,我们提出了一个新的多阶段框架,ChargePrint,以发现互联网连接的EVCMS并研究其安全态势。ChargePrint利用从EVCMS的小种子中提取的标识符,通过迭代指纹识别和分类和聚类方法的组合来扩展设备搜索引擎的功能。利用1800个部署了9种不同EVCMS的主机的初始种子,我们确定了由44种独特EVCMS检测的27,439个在线EVCS。因此,我们的深入安全分析通过揭示120个0天漏洞来强调部署的EVCMS的不安全性,这揭示了针对EVCS,其用户和连接电网的网络攻击的可行性。最后,在我们建议应对措施以减轻未来威胁的同时,我们通过与系统开发人员/供应商进行协调漏洞披露(CVD)工作,为EVCS生态系统的安全做出贡献,这些系统开发人员/供应商承认并分配了20多个cve - id漏洞。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信