Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Value around the World

Ricardo Correa, Ugur Lel
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引用次数: 20

Abstract

Using a sample of about 90,000 observations from 38 countries over the 2001-2012 period, we provide three novel findings regarding say on pay (SoP) laws. First, we find robust evidence that SoP laws reduce CEO pay growth rates at firms. Second, such laws decrease the portion of total top management pay captured by CEOs. Firm values are higher following SoP laws in part because of this reduction in managerial pay inequality. Third, mandatory SoP laws only affect the CEO pay growth rates whereas advisory SoP laws influence various aspects of executive pay policies. These results are robust to instrumental variable estimation and nearest neighbor matching methods.
关于世界各地的薪酬法律、高管薪酬、薪酬切片和公司价值的看法
利用2001年至2012年期间来自38个国家的约9万份观察样本,我们提供了关于薪酬话语权(SoP)法律的三个新发现。首先,我们找到了强有力的证据,证明标准操作程序法降低了公司CEO的薪酬增长率。其次,此类法律降低了首席执行官在高管薪酬总额中所占的比例。遵循SoP法律的公司价值更高,部分原因是管理层薪酬不平等的减少。第三,强制性SoP法律只影响CEO薪酬增长率,而咨询性SoP法律影响高管薪酬政策的各个方面。这些结果对工具变量估计和最近邻匹配方法具有鲁棒性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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