The Citizens United Gambit in Corporate Theory: A Reply to Bainbridge on Strine and Walter

D. Yosifon
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Abstract

In a forthcoming article, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo Strine and Nicholas Walter contribute to a growing chorus of analysts insisting that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) undermines the viability of the shareholder primacy norm in corporate theory. Professor Stephen Bainbridge has published a critique of Strine and Walter’s argument. In this brief essay, I criticize Bainbridge’s critique, and argue that the Citizens United gambit in corporate theory is indeed a compelling challenge to shareholder primacy theory.
企业理论中的公民联合策略:对班布里奇关于斯特因和沃尔特的回答
在即将发表的一篇文章中,特拉华州最高法院首席大法官Leo Strine和Nicholas Walter加入了越来越多的分析人士的阵营,他们坚持认为,美国最高法院在“联合公民诉联邦选举委员会”(Citizens United v. FEC, 2010)一案中的判决削弱了股东至上原则在公司理论中的可行性。Stephen Bainbridge教授发表了一篇对Strine和Walter观点的批评文章。在这篇简短的文章中,我批评了班布里奇的批评,并认为联合公民在公司理论中的策略确实是对股东至上理论的有力挑战。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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