{"title":"Ijtihād and the Function of Legal Theory","authors":"Nathan Spannaus","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190251789.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Ijtihad is a major aspect of Qursawi’s reformism. He understands it as the exercise of Islamic legal interpretation, forming a necessary link between scripture and the daily life of the community. But he argues that the structures of taqlid, especially rigid ranks for fuqaha within the madhhab, have severed that link. He states that ijtihad must be carried out, and he takes the radical position that it is an obligation upon all Muslims. Everyone should learn methods of interpretation to verify scholars’ pronouncements and determine correct action. In this, he relies on conventional Hanafi jurisprudence, if broadened in its scope. Although at odds with his contemporaries, who insisted upon taqlid (in some cases to an extreme degree) this chapter argues that this radical stance is warranted by the changes to the ulama under Russian rule, and obliging legal interpretation upon everyone promotes adherence to sharia in an environment where it had been undermined.","PeriodicalId":118792,"journal":{"name":"Preserving Islamic Tradition","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Preserving Islamic Tradition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190251789.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Ijtihad is a major aspect of Qursawi’s reformism. He understands it as the exercise of Islamic legal interpretation, forming a necessary link between scripture and the daily life of the community. But he argues that the structures of taqlid, especially rigid ranks for fuqaha within the madhhab, have severed that link. He states that ijtihad must be carried out, and he takes the radical position that it is an obligation upon all Muslims. Everyone should learn methods of interpretation to verify scholars’ pronouncements and determine correct action. In this, he relies on conventional Hanafi jurisprudence, if broadened in its scope. Although at odds with his contemporaries, who insisted upon taqlid (in some cases to an extreme degree) this chapter argues that this radical stance is warranted by the changes to the ulama under Russian rule, and obliging legal interpretation upon everyone promotes adherence to sharia in an environment where it had been undermined.