The Effect of Female Leadership on Contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street

Jonathan Brogaard, N. Gerasimova, M. Rohrer
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians increase the proportion of US government procurement contracts allocated to women-owned firms. The identification strategy uses close elections for the US House of Representatives. The effect concentrates in local contractors and persists after the female’s politician departure. The more gender-balanced representation in government contracting does not seem to be associated with economic costs, as the firm characteristics of the average contractor and contract performances are unchanged. By analyzing congressional requests from legislators to federal agencies, we show that female politicians affect procurement contract allocation through individual oversight.
女性领导对从国会山到大街小巷的承包的影响
本文提供了新的证据,证明女性政治家增加了分配给女性拥有的公司的美国政府采购合同的比例。这种识别策略利用了美国众议院的势均力敌的选举。这种影响主要集中在当地承包商身上,并在女性政治家离开后持续存在。政府合同中性别更均衡的代表性似乎与经济成本无关,因为一般承包商的坚定特征和合同执行情况没有改变。通过分析国会议员对联邦机构的要求,我们发现女性政治家通过个人监督影响采购合同的分配。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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