Why Do Dealers Buy High and Sell Low? An Analysis of Persistent Crossing in Extremely Segmented Markets

V. Atanasov, John J. Merrick, Philipp Schuster
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

We find that small buy trades of U.S. agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are priced 3%-8% lower than large sell trades. No such “crossing” exists in corporate bonds and agency debentures. We attribute the MBS price patterns to impediments to position aggregation in combination with investor suitability rules that disproportionately affect retail-sized trading and show in a model that classic market frictions cannot produce crossing. Our findings imply that valuations placed on securities affected by aggregation and suitability frictions should adjust for position size. Such securities include not only agency MBS, but also ABS, CMBS, CMOs, CLOs, and private-label RMBS.
为什么交易商高买低卖?极端分割市场的持续交叉分析
我们发现,小额买入美国机构抵押贷款支持证券(MBS)的价格比大额卖出交易低3%-8%。在公司债券和机构债券中不存在这种“交叉”。我们将MBS的价格模式归因于头寸聚集的障碍,以及投资者适合性规则,这些规则不成比例地影响散户规模的交易,并在一个模型中表明,经典的市场摩擦不会产生交叉。我们的研究结果表明,受聚合和适宜性摩擦影响的证券估值应根据头寸规模进行调整。这些证券不仅包括机构MBS,还包括ABS、CMBS、cmo、clo和自有品牌RMBS。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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