TIME TO GO BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 2017 PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS REVEALS THEM TO BE SHORT OF THE LEGALITY-CUM-RATIONALITY MARK

L. Kohn
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Abstract

Tendering has become an increasingly messy, high-stakes business; a disconcerting fact given the essential role public procurement plays in ensuring the delivery of vital goods and services to the public (using public money). The new (2017) Procurement Regulations complicate matters through, in particular, their allowance of pre-qualification criteria based on preference. In this article, I analyse three key ways in which the new Regulations seek to go further in the name of empowerment at the expense of competitiveness and hence cost-effectiveness. I illustrate that while not all of these new tools fall short of the legal mark, the use of tender conditions based upon preference for the purposes of pre-qualification, is unlawful and irrational given the methodology under the empowering Procurement Act and the need to give effect to all the constitutional procurement principles in a balanced way. I consider the likely practical knock-on effects of this; namely a perverse increase in fronting practices and hence diminished substantive empowerment, and an increase in litigation for non-compliance with tender conditions. On the latter score, I provide a jurisprudential snapshot of our courts’ varying approaches to this assessment, culminating in an analysis of the AllPay test which I caution should be applied correctly and consistently to reduce the increasing lack of certainty in the procurement arena – recently aggravated by our highest court’s greenlight in Gijima for state self-review via the flexible principle of legality. I conclude by making some suggestions for reform that would be congruent with our blueprint constitutional ‘1 st principles’ and perhaps alleviate some of the pressure on our resource-stretched courts.
是时候回到首要原则了:对2017年采购条例的批判性分析表明,它们缺乏合法性和合理性的标志
招标已经成为一个越来越混乱、高风险的行业;鉴于公共采购在确保(使用公共资金)向公众提供重要商品和服务方面发挥的重要作用,这是一个令人不安的事实。新的(2017)采购条例使问题复杂化,特别是允许基于偏好的资格预审标准。在本文中,我分析了新条例以牺牲竞争力和成本效益为代价,在授权的名义下寻求进一步发展的三种关键方式。我要说明的是,虽然并非所有这些新工具都不符合法律标准,但鉴于《授权采购法》规定的方法,以及需要以平衡的方式实施所有宪法采购原则,为资格预审目的使用基于偏好的招标条件是非法和不合理的。我认为这可能会产生实际的连锁反应;也就是说,正面做法的反常增加,从而减少了实质性授权,以及因不遵守投标条件而提起的诉讼增加。关于后一点,我提供了一个法理上的快照,介绍了我们法院对这种评估的不同方法,最后是对AllPay测试的分析,我警告说,应该正确和一致地应用AllPay测试,以减少采购领域日益缺乏确定性的情况——最近,我们最高法院在Gijima通过灵活的合法性原则对国家自我审查进行了许可,这加剧了这种情况。最后,我提出了一些改革建议,这些建议将符合我们的宪法蓝图“第一原则”,并可能减轻我们资源紧张的法院的一些压力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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