{"title":"‘Men, money and advice’ for Caribbean development","authors":"Sabine Clarke","doi":"10.7765/9781526131409.00011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a break with previous policy, the Colonial Office announced in 1943 that it would promote industrial development in Britain’s colonies. Manufacturing ventures were now deemed essential to raise living standards and address the politically dangerous issue of colonial unemployment. Officials became occupied with the question of what constituted acceptable modes of intervention by metropolitan and colonial governments to facilitate economic diversification. The challenge was to reconcile the need for demonstration of a more constructive approach to development with some longstanding laissezfaire principles. Two wider political issues made Colonial Office attempts to persuade the Caribbean colonies to follow its preferred routes to industrialisation difficult, however. The increasing political autonomy of governments in the Caribbean region meant that Britain could not merely instruct its West Indian possessions to follow its edicts. In addition, it became clear that in the postwar world, the US hoped to shape development across the Caribbean along lines that it found conducive to its own interests. In the face of these challenges, the collation and dissemination of economic advice assumed an important role in the maintenance of Britain’s control over its British West Indian colonies after 1940. After 1944 Britain was involved in direct negotiations with the US about regionwide policies for the West Indies as a member of the Caribbean Commission. Despite the ostensible collaboration represented by this body, discussions between officials reveal substantial and entrenched differences in British and American visions for the industrial development of the Caribbean. These differences proved difficult to reconcile, informed as they were by the wider economic and political priorities of Britain and America in the postwar world. From the perspective of the British government, the actions of the Caribbean","PeriodicalId":371632,"journal":{"name":"Science at the end of empire","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Science at the end of empire","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526131409.00011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In a break with previous policy, the Colonial Office announced in 1943 that it would promote industrial development in Britain’s colonies. Manufacturing ventures were now deemed essential to raise living standards and address the politically dangerous issue of colonial unemployment. Officials became occupied with the question of what constituted acceptable modes of intervention by metropolitan and colonial governments to facilitate economic diversification. The challenge was to reconcile the need for demonstration of a more constructive approach to development with some longstanding laissezfaire principles. Two wider political issues made Colonial Office attempts to persuade the Caribbean colonies to follow its preferred routes to industrialisation difficult, however. The increasing political autonomy of governments in the Caribbean region meant that Britain could not merely instruct its West Indian possessions to follow its edicts. In addition, it became clear that in the postwar world, the US hoped to shape development across the Caribbean along lines that it found conducive to its own interests. In the face of these challenges, the collation and dissemination of economic advice assumed an important role in the maintenance of Britain’s control over its British West Indian colonies after 1940. After 1944 Britain was involved in direct negotiations with the US about regionwide policies for the West Indies as a member of the Caribbean Commission. Despite the ostensible collaboration represented by this body, discussions between officials reveal substantial and entrenched differences in British and American visions for the industrial development of the Caribbean. These differences proved difficult to reconcile, informed as they were by the wider economic and political priorities of Britain and America in the postwar world. From the perspective of the British government, the actions of the Caribbean