{"title":"Mad identity I: Controversial and failed identities","authors":"M. Rashed","doi":"10.1093/MED/9780198786863.003.0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter, “Mad identity I: Controversial and failed identities,” examines the viability of Mad identity as a route to recognition. It develops a distinction between “controversial” and “failed” identities; the former are cases where subjects are wrong about who they think they are but where this can potentially call for revision of the collective category with which they identify, and the latter are cases where subjects are wrong about who they think they are but where this cannot call for such revision. Only identity claims that are judged to be “controversial” can be considered within the scope of recognition. Using four examples of “delusional” identities, the chapter develops an epistemological framework for distinguishing failed from controversial identities, a framework where the notion of “truth value” plays a key role.","PeriodicalId":222338,"journal":{"name":"Madness and the demand for recognition","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Madness and the demand for recognition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/MED/9780198786863.003.0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter, “Mad identity I: Controversial and failed identities,” examines the viability of Mad identity as a route to recognition. It develops a distinction between “controversial” and “failed” identities; the former are cases where subjects are wrong about who they think they are but where this can potentially call for revision of the collective category with which they identify, and the latter are cases where subjects are wrong about who they think they are but where this cannot call for such revision. Only identity claims that are judged to be “controversial” can be considered within the scope of recognition. Using four examples of “delusional” identities, the chapter develops an epistemological framework for distinguishing failed from controversial identities, a framework where the notion of “truth value” plays a key role.