{"title":"Reappraising Dodd-Frank's Living Will Regime","authors":"David K. Suska","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2849810","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Congress mandated that certain financial institutions draft “orderly resolution plans” — colloquially termed “living wills” — that detail how each institution could be unwound in case of insolvency. This living will regime is now more than five years old. Yet as consequential as it has been and promises to be, scholars have largely ignored it, except to opine that it does not solve the problem of “too big to fail.” This article fills that gap in the literature. It explains the origins of the regime, defends it as a pragmatic feature of post-crisis financial regulatory reform, and proposes amendments to bolster its legitimacy and legality.","PeriodicalId":137765,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Society: Private Law - Financial Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2849810","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Congress mandated that certain financial institutions draft “orderly resolution plans” — colloquially termed “living wills” — that detail how each institution could be unwound in case of insolvency. This living will regime is now more than five years old. Yet as consequential as it has been and promises to be, scholars have largely ignored it, except to opine that it does not solve the problem of “too big to fail.” This article fills that gap in the literature. It explains the origins of the regime, defends it as a pragmatic feature of post-crisis financial regulatory reform, and proposes amendments to bolster its legitimacy and legality.