Casimir Lorenz, Ingmar Schlecht, Benjamin Reinhard, Richard Weinhold, R. Mieth
{"title":"Assessing inefficiencies on the German balancing market","authors":"Casimir Lorenz, Ingmar Schlecht, Benjamin Reinhard, Richard Weinhold, R. Mieth","doi":"10.1109/EEM.2014.6861310","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a model of the German spot and balancing markets. We focus on the secondary and tertiary balancing market, analyzing the effect of two factors on procurement costs. First, the length of the time period a single supplier has to provide balancing power for. Second, balancing auctions are held well before the bidding period starts, at a time when electricity demand, as well as renewable feed-in is uncertain. Our results suggest that changing the market design, considering early commitment and the length of time period, could decrease inefficiencies.","PeriodicalId":261127,"journal":{"name":"11th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM14)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"11th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM14)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2014.6861310","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
In this paper, we present a model of the German spot and balancing markets. We focus on the secondary and tertiary balancing market, analyzing the effect of two factors on procurement costs. First, the length of the time period a single supplier has to provide balancing power for. Second, balancing auctions are held well before the bidding period starts, at a time when electricity demand, as well as renewable feed-in is uncertain. Our results suggest that changing the market design, considering early commitment and the length of time period, could decrease inefficiencies.