Trusting the open latent IC backdoors

Abstract

Since the Integrated Circuits (ICs) form the core computing and communication kernels for the personal computing, industries, governments and defense in the modern era, ensuring IC trust -- in the presence of untrusted third-party foundries and unidentified supply chains -- has become a major challenge. The prohibitive cost of manufacturing state-of-the-art ICs in nano-meter scales has made the use of contract foundries and third party Intellectual Property (IP) the dominant microelectronics business practice. The hidden backdoors into the chips are a double-edge sword. On one hand, the clandestine backdoors embedded by the reliable designers or trusted supply chain providers enable tracking or having post-fabrication control of the ICs on the production line and while in-use. On the other hand, the latent backdoors (a.k.a., Trojans) implanted by the untrusted third-party manufacturer or unknown supply chain entities enable the potential external adversaries to control, monitor, or to spy the chip software/data contents and communications. In this talk, we question the contemporary IC backdoor research model directed by interested organizations, primarily defense and government. The talk then suggests better understanding of the hidden backdoor disclosure models to improve the quality and impact of the IC Trust research.