Security Flaws and Improvement of a Cloud-Based Authentication Protocol for RFID Supply Chain Systems

Abstract

Cloud-based radio frequency identification (RFID) is an emerging solution for supply chain systems to solve capacity limitation found in a traditional backend server. However, most of the solutions proposed in previous research works are not suitable to be implemented for resource constrained RFID tags. Therefore, a cloud-based mutual authentication (CMA) protocol was proposed by Lin et al. using a hash function and exclusive-OR and was claimed to achieve confidentiality, untraceability, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy. Furthermore, it was claimed that the protocol is resistant to tag/reader impersonation attacks, replay attacks, desynchronization attacks, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. However, this paper proves that the CMA protocol is vulnerable to two types of attack, namely desynchronization and DoS attacks. A detailed security analysis of the CMA protocol is shown in this paper to prove its security vulnerability. In addition, an enhanced CMA protocol is proposed in this paper that is secure against desynchronization and DoS attacks.