Evaluating Manufacturer's Wholesale Price Policy Under Order Postponement With Buyback Option

S. Bhattacharya, S. Bagchi
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Abstract

In this article, a decentralized newsvendor model is analyzed in the presence of demand uncertainty, where the retailer wishes to postpone his ordering decision by few days until the most accurate demand information is available. The impact of such order postponement on the equilibrium profits of both manufacturer and retailer with and without a buyback contract is subsequently examined to obtain a range of wholesale prices within which the marginal profits for both manufacturer and retailer which are non-negative. Furthermore, it is observed that the possibility of implementing order postponement is higher when it is done in the presence of a buyback contract as it increases the marginal profits for both manufacturer and the retailer and expands the feasible region of wholesale price, which leads to a provision of higher flexibility for negotiation between the manufacturer and the retailer.
带回购选项的订单延期下制造商批发价格政策评估
在这篇文章中,我们分析了一个存在需求不确定性的分散的新闻供应商模型,其中零售商希望将他的订购决策推迟几天,直到获得最准确的需求信息。在此基础上,研究了在有和没有回购合同的情况下,订单延期对制造商和零售商的均衡利润的影响,得到了一个批发价格区间,在这个区间内,制造商和零售商的边际利润都是非负的。此外,我们观察到,当存在回购合同时,实施订单延期的可能性更高,因为它增加了制造商和零售商的边际利润,扩大了批发价格的可行区域,从而为制造商和零售商之间的谈判提供了更高的灵活性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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