Dandelion++: Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees

Abstracts of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems Pub Date : 2018-05-28 DOI:10.1145/3219617.3219620

G. Fanti, S. Venkatakrishnan, Surya Bakshi, Bradley Denby, Shruti Bhargava, Andrew K. Miller, P. Viswanath

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引用次数: 83

Abstract

Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight some simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandleion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network.We evaluate it through experiments on Bitcoin's mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) to demonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.

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蒲公英++:具有正式匿名保证的轻量级加密货币网络

最近的研究表明，比特币网络堆栈中存在严重的匿名性漏洞。特别是，目前广播比特币交易的机制允许第三方观察者将交易链接到发起交易的IP地址。这为低成本、大规模的去匿名化攻击奠定了基础。在这项工作中，我们提出了dandelion++，这是一种具有接近最优信息论保证的大规模去匿名化攻击的第一原理防御。蒲公英++基于最近一个名为Dandelion的提案，该提案展示了类似的目标。然而，在本文中，我们强调了在Dandelion中做出的一些简化假设，并展示了它们如何在违反时导致严重的去匿名化攻击。与此相反，Dandelion++防御那些被允许违反协议的更强大的对手。dandleion++是轻量级的，可扩展的，并且与现有的比特币网络完全可互操作。我们通过在比特币主网(即实时比特币网络)上的实验来评估它，以证明其互操作性和低广播延迟开销。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Abstracts of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems

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