Coordinating renewable microgrids for reliable reserve services: a distributionally robust chance-constrained game

Abstract

Networked microgrids aggregate distributed energy resources (DERs) and flexible loads to reach the minimum capacity for market participation and provide reserve services for the main grid. However, due to uncertain renewable generations such as solar power, microgrids might under-deliver reserve services and breach the day-ahead contracts in the real-time market. If multiple microgrids fail to deliver services as promised, this could lead to a severe grid contingency. This paper designs a distributionally robust chance-constrained (DRCC) market game simulating risk-aware bidding and system-wide reserve policy. Leveraging historical error samples, the reserve bidding strategy of each microgrid is formulated into a two-stage Wasserstein-metrics distribution robust optimization (DRO) model. A CC regulates the under-delivered reserve allowance of all microgrids’ reserve contracts in a non-cooperative game. Case studies are performed using the CAISO data. The proposed game is simulated under the reserve policy at different risk-aware levels and numbers of players to model the market behaviors and DER adoption. Results show the under-delivered reserve can be effectively regulated while securing the profit of microgrids in this game framework.