Why cosmopolitan war is an ethics of fantasy?

Abstract

This article argues that Fabre’s cosmopolitan war is implausible because it ignores the psychological realities of war. Building on J.L. Mackie’s notion of an ‘ethics of fantasy’ – a morality reduced to lip-service and incapable of action-guiding – I argue that a view based on a flawed view of either human agency or the context in which it is exercised is doomed to practical irrelevance. In rejecting patriotism and advancing a highly individualistic view of war, Fabre relies upon a highly flawed view of human agency, ignoring the psychological mechanism of depersonalisation essential to large-scale cooperation and the practice of war. In Part i, I offer an initial account of what an ‘ethics of fantasy’ is and offer one major reason why certain moralities fail as practical guidance. In Part ii, I contrast Fabre’s moral cosmopolitanism with ancient cosmopolitanism; I focus on her rejection of patriotism and other identity-based forms of partiality. In Part iii, I summarise key findings, mostly in social psychology, on how large-scale social cooperation is achieved. I highlight the central role of depersonalisation and its felicity conditions. In Part iv, I argue that Fabre’s view faces a dilemma. Either her cosmopolitanism is compatible with identity-based partiality, or it is not. If not, then she does not even have a view of war given that large-scale cooperation requires it. If her view is compatible, then she needs a functional replacement for patriotism. I conclude by showing that the alternatives fail to satisfy the felicity conditions of depersonalisation which war requires.