The Value of Smart Contract in Trade Finance

Xiaoyu Wang, Fasheng Xu
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Problem definition: Smart contract improves the supply chain efficiency by enabling the supplier’s commitment to postshipment financing decisions, which mitigates the bank’s lending risk exposure and thereby reduces the financing cost. This paper investigates how smart contract adoption could facilitate trade finance activities and create value for supply chain firms. Academic/practical relevance: As the emerging blockchain technology could potentially reshape the trade financing landscape, understanding the impact of smart contract adoption and its interaction with trade finance activities is practically relevant and of great importance. Methodology: We develop a two-stage game-theoretic model and adopt supply chain finance theory to characterize the strategic interactions between supply chain firms in the presence of both operational risk (demand uncertainty) and financial risks (credit and liquidity risks). Results: We find that the value of smart contract depends critically on the trade finance structures, including both preshipment and postshipment financing schemes. Under the baseline trade finance model (with purchase order financing as preshipment financing and factoring as postshipment financing), smart contract alleviates the supplier’s overpricing behavior caused by commitment frictions and helps restore the supply chain efficiency. When buyer direct financing serves as an alternative preshipment financing, smart contract might discourage the retailer from offering buyer direct financing, which significantly hurts the supplier and thus reduces the supply chain profit. When invoice trading serves as the alternative postshipment financing, the supplier always chooses invoice trading over factoring because of its trading flexibility, which in turn, makes the commitment frictions ubiquitous and unresolvable (namely, commitment trap). As a result, invoice trading could unexpectedly lead to a lower supplier’s profit. Luckily, such an adoption dilemma can be resolved by smart contract adoption in conjunction with factoring. Managerial implications: Our findings provide guidelines for and insights into when smart contract should be adopted and its interactions with different trade finance schemes. In particular, smart contract adoption does not always benefit the supply chain.
智能合约在贸易融资中的价值
问题定义:智能合约通过使供应商承诺出货后融资决策来提高供应链效率,从而减轻银行的贷款风险敞口,从而降低融资成本。本文探讨了智能合约的采用如何促进贸易融资活动并为供应链企业创造价值。学术/实践相关性:由于新兴的区块链技术可能会重塑贸易融资格局,因此了解智能合约采用的影响及其与贸易融资活动的互动具有实际意义和重要性。方法:我们建立了一个两阶段博弈论模型,并采用供应链金融理论来描述供应链企业在存在操作风险(需求不确定性)和财务风险(信用和流动性风险)的情况下的战略互动。结果:我们发现智能合约的价值在很大程度上取决于贸易融资结构,包括装运前和装运后融资方案。在基线贸易融资模型下(采购订单融资为装船前融资,保理为装船后融资),智能合约缓解了供应商因承诺摩擦而产生的过高定价行为,有助于恢复供应链效率。当买方直接融资作为装运前融资的替代方案时,智能合约可能会阻碍零售商向买方提供直接融资,这将严重损害供应商的利益,从而降低供应链利润。当发票交易作为装运后融资的备选方案时,由于其交易灵活性,供应商总是选择发票交易而不是保理,这使得承诺摩擦无处不在且无法解决(即承诺陷阱)。因此,发票交易可能会意外地导致供应商的利润下降。幸运的是,这种采用困境可以通过结合保理的智能合约采用来解决。管理意义:我们的研究结果为何时采用智能合约及其与不同贸易融资计划的相互作用提供了指导和见解。特别是,智能合约的采用并不总是有利于供应链。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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